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ABSTRACT: A failure in administrative approximation, as established by the EU Treaties, 
tends towards the perpetuation of  systems that keep an organisational statu quo favorable to the 
stagnation of  European integration by limiting its spread beyond urban areas to rural areas. The 
phenomena of  asymmetric economic development within Member States, in turn, allows for the 
maintenance of  this organisational and integrative inertia in highly centralised Member States, 
serving as a one of  the engines for the development of  anti-EU sentiment and vote. In this sense 
the reasoning behind the establishment of  local and regional power as a constitutional bulwark 
against the development of  an illiberal or authoritarian list, especially in young democracies, becomes 
especially important when framed in context with the growth of  authoritarian anti-EU movements 
throughout Europe. This growth, finding an eager bulwark in rural areas, is not coincidental 
and might be attributed to the distance from the decision-making process that local and regional 
government struggle with, combined with economic stagnation and difficulties in the use of  resources 
and opportunities that are theoretically afforded by EU membership, leads to the development of  
anti-EU sentiment, offering political support and democratic legitimacy to projects which oppose the 
EU and prove detrimental to democratic systems. This paper therefore posits that to safeguard the 
development of  the greater European project and democracy within Member States, there must be 
an expansion of  the very same principles that govern the interactions between Member States and 
the EU to the subnational level, with a special focus on subsidiarity.
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1. Introduction
Despite the long-acknowledged view that regional and local governments have 
the potential to be a driving force in the advancement of  European integration, 
these have taken a backseat in the development of  the greater European political 
project. Instead, alternate, more classically inspired means of  integration came to the 
fore with citizenship taking the forefront. This approach has rewarded the Union 
with results that while promising are also uninspiring, having failed to capture the 
collective interest of  Europeans throughout the Union. As a corollary, this failure 
in the development of  local and regional government as an engine that would unite 
Europeans, also resulted in the foundering of  preeminence and relevancy for these 
figures, a cruel fate considering the efforts that the European Union (“EU”) has 
lavished in local and regional government, with the European Cohesion Policy being 
regarded as the European investment policy.
The importance and value of  these administrations, especially regarding 
the approximation with European citizens is far from being an innovation in the 
European landscape. In fact, it merely operated in the realisation of  Article 1.º 
of  the EU Treaty and the structural thoughts it enshrines. It is, therefore, almost 
fitting that such a deeply rooted failure has led the Union to be confronted with 
political phenomena which strike at those very core principles in defiance of  the 
investments made, with rural areas providing eager support to political movements 
that are antagonistic to the EU, and indeed, democratic values, despite deep rural 
dependence upon the project they eschew. 
This paper intends to analyse the reasons for this phenomenon, the interactions 
that occur between the European Union and the Constitutional and Administrative 
traditions of  Member States to glimpse a solution for challenges that strike at the 
core of  this political project. This, we posit, may be put into motion by bringing back 
the regions and localities back to the forefront of  European integration and citizen 
interaction.
2. Contextualisation of  the European political panorama
A common criticism levied against the European Union and presented as a 
barrier to its greater political aspirations is the so called “democratic deficit” which, 
in combination with other factors has translated in the national development of  
Eurosceptic parties in Member States,1 eventually finding a seat at a greater European 
level in institutions like the EU Parliament and the European Council.
A peculiarity about these political manifestations, now ubiquitous within the 
EU and its Member States2 is that not all these political movements are necessarily 
opposed to the core principles enshrined by the Union. Some of  these Movements, 
eventually represented in Political Groups and Families within the EU Parliament, 
merely disagree with it in its current configuration, taking exception either to its 
market economy approach, its Ordoliberal inspired system of  social guarantees or by 
opposing its federalising project. In this sense, despite opposition to the development 
1 Vivien A. Schmidt, The Eurozone’s crisis of  democratic legitimacy: can the EU rebuild public trust and support 
for European Economic Integration? (Luxembourg: European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs Discussion Paper, Publications Office of  the European Union, 
2015), 18.
2 Catherine E. De Vries and Erica E. Edwards, “Taking Europe to its extremes: extremist parties and public 
euroscepticism”, Party Politics, v. 15, no. 1 (2009): 5–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808097889, 6.
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of  Union along current lines, these political forces are not necessarily opposed to 
its existence. They just disagree on what should be its purpose, mechanisms, or 
objectives, clamoring for changes to its core values and systems, or a return to the 
preeminence of  state sovereignty and in Westphalian conceptions. However, due to 
the nature of  European political integration and its intentionally deliberate pace, this 
opposition generally only translates in a slowing of  European integration.3
Despite the apparent threat that these political developments show toward 
the development the greater European project, they share a myriad of  core values 
such as the democratic principle, rule of  law, and a respect for fundamental rights 
in such a way that still upholds and protects EU citizens. Due to those very same 
combined values and principles, their protection and continuation is not threatened 
by these forces, which in turn translates in an accidental reinforcement of  European 
integration, and through it, the EU. This occurs because through this sharing of  
core values, even if  a political movement is outwardly opposed to the EU, they 
are not opposed to the furthering of  these values by it, allowing for a slow but 
intense development of  a system based on mutual dependency between Member 
States and the greater EU project even if  political forces within them are nominally 
opposed. This means that far from these politically opposed movements being 
detrimental to the Union, they assist in its sedimentation and legitimisation in the 
sense that this outward dichotomy whilst sharing a set of  basic principles gives body 
to the realisation of  the democratic principle and furnishes precious feedback in the 
integration process without a complete rejection or calls for disbanding. Therefore, 
we must consider that certain stances though formulated in opposition to the 
European project may serve to reinforce the project in the long run by defining the 
ideal rate of  integration. Through this slowing and establishment of  boundaries to 
the EU’s scope of  action occurs safeguarding of  interests held by certain Member 
States and citizens who more zealously seek to maintain elements of  traditional 
national sovereignty, for whatever reason deemed necessary. If  a subsequent need 
for integration in these previously “gated off ” areas is deemed necessary, this need 
would only serve to legitimise the Union’s eventual intervention while increasing its 
visibility in said intervention. The element of  visibility and the perception of  the EU 
as a powerful tool for the solution of  issues seldom resolved using more traditional 
means. This is an essential element in further justifying and therefore strengthening 
and legitimising its federalising project.
In stark opposition with this moderate Eurosceptic school of  thought, 
manifested within every part of  the political spectrum, an emerging set of  political 
movements present a much more pressing challenge to the larger European project 
due to their opposition, not only, to the very values that lie at the base of  not only 
the EU, but of  the constitutional identity of  Member States and greater democratic 
principles.4 These movements, characterised by authoritarian stances have enjoyed a 
gradual implementation, not just in Europe, but throughout the globe being termed 
illiberal democracies.5 These regimes, often headed by so called “strongmen” tend 
3 De Vries and Edwards, “Taking Europe to its extremes”, 10.
4 Han Werts, Peer Scheepers and Marcel Lubbers, “Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting 
in Europe, 2002–2008: social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics 
determining voting for the radical right”, European Union Politics, v. 14, no. 2 (2013): 183-205, doi: 
10.1177/1465116512469287.
5 Fareed Zakaria, “The rise of  illiberal democracy”, Foreign Affairs, v. 76, no. 6 (1997): 22-43, 22-24.
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to show a conservative, assertive and anti-system stance, endeavouring to create 
an appearance of  control and order through the use of  conflict, be it legislative, 
political or physical.6 Through the combination of  these characteristics and the 
inevitable interactions at a global scale, these phenomena have mostly presented 
themselves in Western democracies as positioning themselves in the far-right of  the 
political spectrum.7 One should note that this type of  thought in Europe tends to 
manifest itself  in a new and much more worrying variety of  Euroscepticism than 
the one previously mentioned. These political projects present themselves as being 
directly opposed to the European project, often being based on an anti-system, 
anti-integration and nationalistic platform, claiming to uphold the interests of  the 
citizens of  the Member States and that  they are operating in opposition to the 
perceived abandonment by the greater European political system.8 In this way, the 
core principle base directly opposes itself  to the values of  the Union to which we 
made previous mention, claiming for a return to values and a statu quo that not only 
is impossible in a modern context, but possibly that never was present.9
In this way, not only is there a clash of  perspectives on policies regarding 
economic and social development, or a disagreement on the rhythm of  European 
integration and approximation, but a value and ideological confrontation. The 
development of  a political discourse that calls for the “recovery” of  potentially 
unattainable values is especially seductive in the sense that it simply promises the 
recuperation of  historical stances. Within these promises towards the adoption, 
with historic stances also comes a tacit promise of  the recovery of  certain social or 
economic equilibriums which are particularly appealing in regions or groups who 
suffer from a rising gap in inequality. These political forces, therefore, do not truly 
aim to impede the continuation or undermine the existence of  the European project, 
instead showing a disinterest in the core values which underline the EU political 
construction. However, precisely due to this disinterest, the rights acquired by 
European citizens by their enfranchisement into the EU are put in a position liable 
to erosion by these political manifestations which can eventually lead to a weakening 
of  European integration and through it, the greater peace project that serves as a 
prius to the EU.
3. The role of  the regions and local government in this statu quo
With this short overview over the democratic state of  the Union, one can 
consider in what way these problems interact with one of  the greatest hurdles 
that European legitimacy faces, the so called “democratic deficit”, and its connection 
to the institutional language and organisation of  local and regional power within 
the European Union. It is to note that this democratic deficit is one of  the more 
frequent criticisms levied by Anti-EU political movements at the European Union 
6 Yahor Azarkevich, “A strongman at home is a strongman abroad? Investigating operational Codes of  
Aliaksandr Lukašenka and Donald Trump” (Master’s Thesis, Cracow: Jagiellonian University - Faculty 
of  International and Political Studies - Institute of  European Studies, 2020) and Heino Nyyssönen 
and Jussi Metsälä, “Liberal democracy and its current illiberal critique: the emperor’s new clothes?”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, v. 73, no. 2 (2020): 273-290, doi: 10.1080/09668136.2020.1815654, 277.
7 Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers, “Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe”.
8 De Vries and Edwards, “Taking Europe to its extremes”, 8 and Azarkevich, “A strongman at home 
is a strongman abroad?”.
9 Nyyssönen and Metsälä, “Liberal democracy and its current illiberal critique”, 283-285.
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and rival political movements within Member States, under the ostensive banner of  
democracy values and the upholding of  customary values and public will.
In this context, an urban/rural split in anti-EU voting has already been 
identified by organs and institutions of  the European Union, with studies regarding 
this issue having been commissioned to identify the reason for this phenomenon.10 
As we previously mentioned, not all anti-EU movements have at their core an 
ideological opposition to the principle and value base of  the EU. Indeed, many of  
them claim to champion cultural, constitutional, and intra-national diversity, but the 
rise of  political movements and ideological stances that are, de facto, contrary to these 
elements presents a concern. This concern is bellied by the remarkable electoral 
achievements that these stances show, with these political movements placing figures 
in high office and decision-making spheres in several Member States, forcing us to 
consider why exactly rural areas present themselves as a fertile political ground for 
the development of  these movements.
In a 2020 Working Paper by the European Commission titled “The Urban-
Rural Divide in Anti-EU Vote”, three factors are identified as being determinate, (i) 
growth in local unemployment levels, (ii) low voter turnout rates, (iii) a higher share 
of  people born outside the EU (with the tendency reversing itself  with a higher rate 
of  population born in other EU Member States). After these factors, the factors 
of  greatest importance were an aged population, a faltering regional economy, and 
a lower percentage of  the population with tertiary education degrees, the regional 
and socio-demographic variables.11 Even a cursory examination of  these elements 
reveals the intimate connection between a region’s economic development and their 
eventual demographic repercussions. Considering the effort that the EU takes into 
the development of  its regions and how, conceptually, it strives for gradual economic 
development of  the entire European territory, not merely the Member States unitarily, 
we must wonder why their efforts offer such contradictory results. Indeed, with the 
Economic Cohesion plan, absorbing nearly a third of  the entire EU Budget between 
2014 and 2020, and ranking as the principal investment policy of  the Union, we must 
consider why this effort seems to fail in the eyes of  the intended beneficiaries.12
Far from being a subject with mere political, electoral, or programmatic interest, 
this is a subject that speaks at the heart of  the European construction. The principles 
of  European solidarity, an outgrowth from the greater principal of  loyalty, is supposed 
to operate as a counterweight to the blind application of  certain demands and 
behaviours.13 Despite its origins in the regulation of  interactions between Member 
States, it remains a constant reminder that in order for the European Union to remain 
as a cohesive construction it requires a measure of  empathy and intersubjectivity. 
This intersubjectivity however, cannot merely be applied between Member States, 
but also between regions and local governments at a multinational level and within 
Member States regarding these forms of  government.
10 Laura de Dominicis, Lewis Dijkstra and Nicola Pontarollo, The urban-rural divide in anti-EU vote: 
social, demographic and economic factors affecting the vote for parties opposed to European integration (Luxembourg: 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy Working Paper, Publications Office of  the 
European Union, 2020).
11 De Dominicis, Dijkstra and Pontarollo, “The urban-rural divide in anti-EU vote”, 15.
12 “The EU’s main investment policy”, accessed June 15, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/policy/what/investment-policy/.
13 Klaus Stern, Derecho del Estado de la Republica Federal de Alemania (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos 
y Constitucionales, 1987).
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One cannot escape the reality that without an economic equilibrium, fostered by 
this European solidarity, the cornerstone of  European political construction that is 
the common market is put into serious doubt if  a perception of  economic asymmetry 
seeps through.14 The idea that there are groups that benefit disproportionally from 
such an economic community, or even that others benefit to a lesser extent in 
comparison, undermines any political system that is built over it. The disintegration 
of  this shared foundation would only serve to undermine any identity or political 
developments made towards European integration and without these shared identities 
being developed sufficiently to contend with narratives which call for a past marketed 
as fallow of  such asymmetries, it results in the European project being portrayed 
as oppressive to the economic and democratic self-determination of  the peoples 
of  Europe.15 The implementation of  these perspectives, therefore, operates as a 
prius to the development of  the resentment and recuperation of  historical conflicts 
that function as a political tool in the affirmation of  these political movements. A 
system that results, or merely appears to result in a group benefitting while another 
is exploited is a grave threat to the development of  a European project by operating 
as a catalyst to recuperation of  rivalries, factionalism, and the growth of  nationalist 
movements, shortly abandoned but seemingly long forgotten. In that sense, one can 
claim Europe as a victim to its own success. By bringing such a level of  integration 
and economic development to the Member States, it has reached a point in which 
these seemingly do not recognize their dependence to the political construction 
they have bound themselves to. One must recognise that these difficulties, far from 
being a flaw in the implementation of  the European community, are an intended 
characteristic of  European approximation serving, as mentioned previously, as 
a barometer for the rate of  integration preventing it from being intolerably swift. 
This very same slow, deliberate pace that allows for the underlying plan of  gradual 
implementation to be forgotten, allows its attack by political agents eager to profit 
(often materially as well) from its subversion.
Far from only impacting Member States however, this dynamic has internal 
repercussions, harkening to the challenges witnessed in a more Westphalian 
conception of  national sovereignty. Indeed, in the aftermath of  Brexit both pro- and 
anti-European observers raised the specter of  Balkanization as a looming challenge 
faced by the EU and both former and current Member States in coming years, owing 
to internal conflict and the establishment of  groups positioning themselves for or 
against greater self-determination.16 For these reasons, the importance of  the Principle 
of  solidarity as an escape valve has never been higher in this role as a moderator in 
the interactions between Member States, though perhaps even more importantly, 
within them. One often forgotten requisite inherent in the Principle of  European 
solidarity however, is trust.17 For this trust to be rewarded with tangible results, a 
14 This thought pre-exists the Ordoliberal conceptualization as per Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist 
no. 12”, in The Federalist Papers, eds. Alexander Hamilton, James Jay and John Madison (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
15 Francesco Nicoli, “Democratic deficit and its counter-movements: the Eurocentric–Eurosceptic 
divide in times of  functional legitimacy”, in Anti-Europeanism: critical perspectives towards the European 
Union, ed. Marco Baldassari, Emanuele Castelli, Matteo Truffelli and Giovanni Vezzani (Springer, 
2019), 13–29.
16 Vasko Naumovski, “Europeanization of  the Balkans, or Balkanization of  Europe?”, Georgetown 
Journal of  International Affairs, v. 20, no. 1 (2019): 120.
17 Jean-Claude Barbier, “Languages, Political Cultures and Solidarity in Europe”, Online Working Paper 
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measure of  administrative deconcentration, through for example the delegation of  
responsibilities, is necessary to allow for the regional development within Member 
States as the application of  funds requires effective governance and a measure of  
self-determination to, at the very least, determine investment priorities.18 Without 
these essential governing tools one cannot foresee a way in which these Regions, 
Municipalities and Local Governments will develop the means and institutional 
experience that would allow them to take full advantage of  the opportunities afforded 
to them not only by Member States provide, but by the European Union and support 
structures in the European Council.19
4. The organisation of  regional and local administrations and 
their role in European integration
The convergence of  administrative law between Member States has been 
recognised since at least the 1970´s, with Community Law being a significant factor 
in this development through a reciprocal influence between judicial systems.20 These 
examples present themselves as an example of  substantial European integration with 
Jürgen Schwarze recognising that though in a first stage, European administrative 
systems informed the development of  EU law,21 in a second stage this tendency 
reversed, with EU law affecting the development of  national legal systems.22 In 
this paper we consider particularly relevant the alterations that arise from this latter 
interaction, especially at an administrative subnational level.
Considering that the Union, as previously mentioned, considers regional 
development as one of  its core priorities,23 the extension of  resources and support 
that permit for these investments to have a material effet utile also becomes a tacit 
priority. Indeed, only through this effet utile can there be a justification for the 
trust that underlines these initiatives. However, for these investments to have an 
effect, one cannot discount the impact that gaps in competence and administrative 
organisation have in the facilitation or hindering in the use of  investment or support. 
Administrations at a local and regional level are in a privileged position to combat the 
marginalisation of  non-urban areas, marginalisation which results in the perception 
of  abandonment and in distrust for a larger European project that ironically, considers 
them one of  its preeminent considerations. No matter its volume or nature, an 
investment that does not present lasting structural effects in the intended region will 
no. 01 (Helsinki: RECODE – Responding to Complex Diversity in Europe and Canada, 2012), 6-8.
18 Rajeev Goel, Ummad Mazhar, Michael Nelson and Rati Ram, “Government Decentralization and 
International Government Performance”, CESifo Working Paper Series, no.6013 (München: Center for 
Economic Studies and Ifo Institute, 2016), 2 and 16.
19 Thomas A. Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’? On heterogeneity, 
representation and functionality of  the Committee of  the Regions after 2004”, Amsterdam Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2013-15 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Centre for European Law and 
Governance, March 13, 2013), 27-28.
20 Sophie Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, in Direito da União Europeia - elementos de direito e políticas 
da União, ed. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho and Pedro Froufe (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016),73-
163.
21 One could almost establish a nexus between this administrative approximation and European 
interconstitutionality through the influence exerted in the principle and value core of  the Union. 
Considering of  the way that administrative systems derive from a state’s Constitutional framework.
22 Sophie Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, 86.
23 This is one of  Europe’s constant objectives taking form not just in policy or declarations, but more 
importantly, also as a monetary investment, as previously cited.
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not be effective in combating neither a rapidly increasing economic gap, but perhaps 
more relevant for the issue at hand, the self-perception of  marginalisation.
In order to take to access these lines of  support and assess the merits of  
alternative implementation plans in a manner that offers meaningful results, local 
and regional administrations require a measure for a basic cast of  competencies, 
institutional complexity and basic integration in the greater European panorama.24 
The proximity and approximation between these forms of  government and the 
population they represent may prove a powerful advantage by allowing for a keener 
understanding of  the characteristics of  that polity.25 Beyond a mere resource, 
geological, geographic and demographic assessment, this proximity allows for the 
factoring of  elements such as cultural practices, specialised knowledge bases and 
historical factors which would be difficult to factor by outside observers. For the 
development of  plans that take advantage of  these specific and valuable, yet often 
ignored characteristics, one needs the technical and institutional capability and 
maturity to aid in the implementation of  development projects. This requirement 
is constant no matter the source of  the investment be it European or otherwise, 
therefore, more important than the recognition of  the origins of  this investment, it 
must prove useful to reduce the feeling of  distance from policy makers.
In addition to this experience, these forms of  government require the capacity, 
competence and powers that allow them to put into practice policies that allow 
for regional development. The need for these powers is twofold: the: (i) need for 
a swift and effective implementation of  these resources, by reducing or eliminating 
the roadblocks regarding the capacity of  these local administrations to implement 
policy; and (ii) the need for the development of  technical experience and capacity 
allowing these administrations to determine the value of  the various options to select 
the ones that will have the greatest effet utile.
In this second point, the inefficient use of  these resources may translate in 
a breach of  the Principle of  European solidarity, namely in the aforementioned 
component of  trust, manifesting in the expectation of  utility and the use of  these 
investments in the most effective way possible.26 An outside observer lacking context 
and accustomed to a well-developed administrative reality is unlikely to recognise the 
unique challenges that specific institutional or organic deficits may pose, perceiving 
an inability to act in a manner that best utilises these opportunities as corruptive 
or deliberately wasteful actions. One cannot forget that the Principle of  solidarity, 
corollary to the Principle of  European loyalty, carries a strong bilateral component in 
the sense that one party cannot discharge their dully held responsibilities. 
This means that one party cannot “take advantage” of  said principle to enjoy 
this solidarity beyond strict necessity. Additionally, this administrative discharge of  
responsibility may put into question the very Principle of  proportionality, as partially 
codified in Article 5.º (4) of  the TEU, in the sense that less grievous or costly measures 
should not be adopted in lieu of  more administratively expedient options when the 
limitations are considered.
24 Mindaugas Butkus, Diana Cibulskiene, Alma Maciulyte-Sniukiene and Kristina Matuzeviciute, 
“What is the evolution of  convergence in the EU? Decomposing EU disparities up to NUTS 3 level”, 
Sustainability, v. 10, no. 5 (2018), 22, doi:10.3390/su10051552.
25 Paul Blokker, “The constitutional premises of  subnational self-government in new democracies”, 
Corvinus Journal of  Sociaoloy and Social Policy, v. 3, no.1 (2012), doi: 10.14267 38.
26 Sophie Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, 136. 
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Returning to our previous thoughts regarding the organisation, capacity, and 
attributions to subnational administrations, it is important to note that this is a matter 
normally under the exclusive purview of  Member States, being perceived as being 
core to their constitutional identity. This is explicitly referenced in Article 4.º, section 
2 of  the European Union Treaty, defining the respect of  national identities “[inherent] 
in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of  regional and local self-
government”, as one of  European Union’s core principles. Additionally, it is bound to 
a respect for the essential State functions “including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State (…)”, our bold emphasis.
As expressly indicated by the Treaties, these subjects cannot be determined 
by the EU falling under the sole purview of  the initiative of  the Member States 
themselves. Indeed, the sheer proximity section 3 of  Article 4.º to the aforementioned 
Section 2 seems to imply that Member States have a further duty to assist in the 
maintenance of  this territorial and State Sovereignty through their actions which: 
“[assist] each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the treaties”. It is, therefore, relevant 
to revisit one of  the more curious innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty 
regarding the Principle of  subsidiarity as defined in Article 5.º, section 3.º of  the 
TEU by defining that the Union acts outside the realms which are not of  its exclusive 
competence only if  and in so far as the objectives of  the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.27 This principle however, also applies at 
a local and regional level while still allowing action at the EU level in order to better 
safeguard its objectives or maximise the utility of  said act due to their scope or 
effect. This is, at first glance, a further confirmation of  the EU’s inability to act in the 
direction of  decentralisation and devolution of  powers in heavily centralised, unitary 
Member States.28 However, a particularly broad interpretation of  this Principle may 
determine that these dispositions in the Treaties not only operate as a starting point 
for this devolution of  competences but enshrine a duty on the part of  Member 
States towards that end. By following this broad interpretation one can find the 
basis for the argument that a particularly centralised and unitary Member State is 
failing in its obligations regarding EU law in the sense that it claims competency 
and capacity for actions that could sufficiently be achieved at a local or regional 
level. This interpretation, perhaps even bolder than what the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union (“CJEU”) would tend towards, finds justification in the constitutive 
Treaties. Article 1 of  the TEU declares: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of  
creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of  Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly 
as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”, our emphasis. We therefore, put 
forward that the Principle of  subsidiarity not only compels a respect on the EUs part 
towards Member States, but also between Member States and finally, between them 
and their local and regional administrations, truly and literally closer to the citizens.29
Such a broad interpretation is, as was mentioned previously, almost a challenge 
to the constitutional traditions of  Member States and their enshrined diversity, surely 
leading any discussions in this subject to become potentially mired in a political and 
ideological minefield. This would hazard the greater European integration by stoking 
and reviving fears, perhaps unfounded had a deeper integration taken place, of  a 
European “Balkanization”. However, it is not beyond the realm of  possibility that 
27 Sophie Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, 104.
28 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 16.
29 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 16-17.
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this interpretation of  the Principle of  subsidiarity will be more widely accepted if, by 
means other than the CJEU’s purview, a trend towards decentralisation takes root on 
the autonomous but concerted initiative of  these local and regional administrations.
The analysis of  the potential role that institutions, organs and organisms of  
the UE can operate towards the reduction of  the high levels of  voter absenteeism 
that are present at a rural level should consider the potential that this political 
empowerment can have in the economic development of  these regions. An 
analysis of  the economic potential that this devolution and decentralisation of  the 
regions should be further examined as it could prove to be a powerful tool in the 
advancement of  these principles, enshrined in the Treaties in the face of  Member 
States who would otherwise be reluctant to undertake in these alterations by using 
their economic frailty as a justification.
5. The Committee of  the Regions
Once hailed by certain authors as a crucial engine for European integration,30 
this advisory body with consultative functions was hailed as a potential forerunner to 
avant la letre multilevel governance. Through the approximation of  federalising forces 
and regionalising interests within the Union, this project was to herald a new EU.31 
Though this prediction did not come to pass, one should not take this outcome as 
indicative of  this body’s potential to foster said integration. Indeed, certain authors 
have expressed the possibility that the Committee of  Regions (“CoR”) can develop 
in a way analogous to the European Parliament and become a European Institution 
in its own right,32 developing a greater influence in the EU’s legislative process.33 In 
that regard, the Treaty of  Lisbon has already taken steps by expanding the number 
of  areas in which the CoRs consultation is mandatory. Beyond this, and perhaps 
even more relevantly, data indicates that their opinions translate into legislative 
results through its influence in the initiatives undertaken by the Commission, with 
certain areas being considered as especially fertile. When one considers the role that 
the Commission has in the European Legislative Process, we can glimpse in what 
way this intervention can be valuable not just for the CoR but to the interests that it 
advances. With the alterations to Article 263.º of  the TFEU defining the CoR as a 
semi-privileged plaintiff  with the legitimacy to initiate an infringement procedure to 
safeguard their prerogatives,34 one can see how this organ is beginning to take shape 
in the EU decision making apparatus. These mechanisms, put in place by the Lisbon 
Treaty allow for the CoRs intervention when its consultative functions are put into 
question by the Commission, these very same mechanisms having been used by 
the European Parliament in its institutional development.35 This puts into focus the 
30 Rosarie E. McCarthy, “The Committee of  the Regions: an advisory body’s tortuous path to 
influence”, Journal of  European Public Policy, v. 4, no. 3 (1997), 441, doi:10.1080/13501769780000091.
31 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 5.
32 Petr Kaniok and Lenka Dadová, “Committee of  the Regions: from advisory body to the second 
chamber of  the European Parliament”, Transylvanian Reviewof  Administrative Sciences, no. 40E (2013): 
114-136.
33 Petr Kaniok and Lenka Dadová, “Committee of  the Regions”.
34 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 14.
35 Justus Schönlau, “Beyond mere ‘consultation’: expanding the European Committee of  the Regions’ 
role”, Journal of  Contemporary European Research, v. 13, no. 2 (2017): 1172, and Mechthild Roos,”Far 
beyond the Treaties’ Clauses: the European Parliament’s gain in power, 1952-1979”, Journal of  
Contemporary European Research, v. 13, no. 2 (2017): 1055-1075.
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possibility of  the CoR taking a similar trajectory in the future, despite it not showing 
that intent now.
From the start the CoR’s development roadblocks were identified in its 
institutional growth as resulting from competing interests within the Committee itself, 
namely the rivalry between regional and local interests.36 This clash of  perspectives 
and interests was only put into sharper focus by the structure of  the Committee 
due to its fundamental goal of  providing a voice to all Member State’s sub-national 
authorities, regardless of  administrative structure or whether said Member States 
had administrative regions at all. This meant that local and regional interests had 
to be present and compete to be heard within the same organ37 despite the clear 
asymmetries between them in terms of  institutional and technical capacity, allowing 
for internal domination of  those who were better prepared for such a participation.
The result of  this competition is that administrative regions, due to their 
greater institutional experience, importance, and prestige and especially those with 
greater competencies, self-determination, and governance capabilities like those of  
Belgium and Germany were able to develop a measure of  ascendancy within this 
organ. Through the use of  what has been described as institutional “shock and awe” 
tactics in regards to the choice of  representatives, often opting to choose ministers 
of  regional governments, these regions were able to monopolise the Committee’s 
agenda.38 Though an outwardly positive influence for the development of  the CoR, 
this monopolisation meant that the Committee served to assure the interests of  these 
very same regions, placing in second stage the interaction and mutual development 
of  more fragile or inexperienced members though the use of  their voting power 
towards the implementation of  agendas that though mutually useful did not act 
towards the coordination and devolution of  subnational competences as these 
regions had already achieved.
From this perspective, in a way confirmed by more recent interviews regarding 
interactions within the CoR, representatives indicate that despite initially existing 
substantial differences in position, these had dissipated with the committee having 
since adopted a more harmonious modus vivendi.39 One may posit that the adoption 
of  said modus vivendi derived from the recognition and acceptance of  the advantages 
derived from the influence that the technical capabilities afforded by the informal 
leadership of  influential regions brought. For this reason, we consider that the 
potential of  the Committee of  Regions has not yet been fulfilled and shall not be 
fulfilled until there is an effective coordination of  interests at a local level, represented 
by the more developed regions. This is because without this capability to organise 
and compete with the interests of  these larger regions, smaller or less developed 
regions and local administrations will remain unable to truly find their voice within 
the CoR as equal partners and advance their interests.
It is telling that Member States seem to have encouraged this early factionalism, 
in a strategy dubbed by Vandamme as a veritable “divide et impera”.40 Member States’ 
capacity to nominate the members of  the CoR, their national assembly’s defining of  
terms in which such a nomination occurs is entirely advantageous to the perpetuation 
36 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 17.
37 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 19-20.
38 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 21 and 27.
39 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 24.
40 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 19.
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of  power structures and internal political organisation, especially if  it already follows 
a highly centralised structure. Those local and regional government structures which 
have already secured a high level of  internal autonomy and decentralisation have 
already secured the capability to ensure their position in the CoR in advantageous 
terms. In contrast, those systems which have not attained a high level of  devolution 
are subject to the political whims and outcomes of  national level policy makers or 
momentary capacity to endeavour in such reforms. A factor contributing to this gap 
is the variation in the means of  selection of  representatives with certain countries 
such as Portugal and the Netherlands not having a legislated system for the selection 
of  these representatives, contrasting with Austria which has attributed this selection 
constitutional dignity.41
The expansion of  competence at a local level through the leveraging of  a 
coordinated stance towards that effect, far from merely implied, was an explicit 
expectation held by some of  the new representatives who entered the CoR upon the 
EU’s expansion in 2007. Further, there was incipient support for the development 
of  regional administration on the part of  the EU in some of  the new democracies 
admitted to the EU, precisely as a bulwark towards their democratic and liberal 
development.42 Upon this expansion, a Polish representative stated his hope that 
this organ could lead to an eventual reinforcement of  the Polish regional system 
(Woiwods).43 This is relevant in the sense that perhaps the largest roadblock 
recognised in the development of  the Committee of  Regions was the organic and 
administrative diversity of  its members, a necessary consequence of  the different 
constitutional traditions of  each Member State and its administrative ramifications. 
This incorporation of  different administrative realities has been recognised as 
a source of  legitimacy of  the Committee, proving itself  as a forum capable of  
receiving a plethora of  perspectives and diverse administrative realities. However, 
as recognised by multiple authors, the downside of  this plurality is that it serves as a 
barrier to the CoR’s capacity to reach a consensus and deliver coordinated action, to 
its and its members’ own detriment. Indeed, some have recognised this as the greatest 
challenge that the CoR faces due to the difficulties presented regarding substantive 
action and basic institutional communication.44
For these reasons, we consider that there is a necessity for approximation 
regarding administrative organisation with a heavy focus on the institutional 
language, modus operandi and basic organisation of  these forms of  local and 
regional administration. This would allow local and regional governments to engage 
in coordinated activity, allowing for a greater policy implementation capacity and a 
more effective safeguard of  local governance interests. This need is justified by the 
disparity in interests witnessed between local, regional and highly developed regional 
representation within the CoR, constraining its development and preventing this 
organ from creating an effective political pressure loop towards the devolution 
of  powers to underdeveloped forms of  local and regional governance. Through 
this process, administrations who have not quite reached this level of  institutional 
development and devolution have the potential to utilise the resources that they have 
access to in a more efficient manner, regardless of  origin of  said resources but with 
41 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 21, 27 and 28.
42 Paul Blokker, “The Constitutional Premises of  Subnational Self-Government in new democracies”, 53.
43 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 17.
44 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 17.
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a special focus on those with an EU origin since these do not stem from Member 
States’ capacity or willingness to act individually. Using the economic development 
that the Single Market allows, these forms of  local governance can achieve the 
capacity and legitimacy to advance these emancipating projects. In this way, the CoR 
can serve as a point of  contact and reflexive approximation, allowing for a political 
osmosis between local and regional polities so that they may, at their own initiative, 
jump start their approximation in administrative organisation. In this manner and 
having achieved their once expected goal of  being privileged units of  European 
integration, they can further approximate governance to the citizenry.
Beyond the CoR, the European Grouping of  Territorial Cooperation may serve 
this purpose of  a point of  communication and coordination. One must take into 
account however, that  what appears to have a been a precautionary measure against 
EU-led administrative decentralisation, this body’s instruments cannot not be used to 
bypass constitutional law of  Member States, a stance described as “in deference” towards 
their Constitutional identities.45 This prohibition however can be surpassed if  this 
approximation occurs on the initiative of  local and regional government themselves, 
at an internal/national level, and coordinated a European level with partners from 
other Member States. This would mean that rather than operating through legislative 
instruments or decisions it could act as a Parliament, it its etymological sense. In this 
regard, the CoR has a significant advantage in the sense that it already self-organises 
by political groups in terms of  political filiation,46 thereby approximating it to the 
European Parliament and allowing a dialog between representatives of  different 
Member States without the restrictions of  national political rivalries. This allows 
for a separation of  the regional/local dichotomy by grouping together politically 
similar partners independent of  their vertical organisation within the Member State 
they represent and surpassing the local/regional level schism that was previously 
witnessed.
6. Reflections and conclusions
A failure of  administrative approximation leads to the perpetuation of  systems 
that keep an organisational status quo favorable to the stagnation of  European 
integration by not allowing its spread beyond urban areas to rural areas, as these are 
the ones who most profit from regional and local organisation.
The reason these mechanisms allow for the maintenance of  this organisational 
and integrative inertia in highly centralised Member States is due to the observed 
phenomena of  the economy of  Member States converging with that of  the Union, 
while within these same Member States said development is far from uniform. 
Indeed, research indicated that there is a tendency for the development of  economic 
asymmetries along urban/rural lines in these highly centralised states.47 As previously 
mentioned, these economic asymmetries are one of  the main factors in the development 
of  anti-EU vote. Using the vote of  European constituents as a barometer for their 
acceptance of  the greater European project, we can trace how resentment levied is at 
the EU for this economic and eventual demographic disintegration. Economic and 
demographic factors being identified as the main factors leading to this anti-EU vote 
allows us to connect the origins of  this phenomena to the mechanisms that allow 
45 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 18.
46 Thomas Vandamme, “Still the Committee of  ‘Legislative Regions’?”, 27-28.
47 Mindaugas Butkus et al., “What is the evolution of  convergence in the EU?”, 22.
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these asymmetries to develop and be maintained. In this sense, the hope expressed 
by the previously alluded to Polish representative to the Committee of  Regions 
proved to be almost clairvoyant by showing the reasoning behind the establishment 
of  local and regional power as a constitutional bulwark against the development of  
an illiberal or authoritarian list, especially in young democracies.48
The growth of  authoritarian anti-EU movements and their prevalence in highly 
centralised new democracies has not escaped notice by certain authors.49 We posit 
that through the aforementioned mechanisms, this growth isn’t coincidental since the 
distance from the decision making process that local and regional government struggle 
with, combined with difficulties in the use of  resources and opportunities that are 
theoretically afforded to them by their EU membership, leads to the development of  
anti-EU sentiment, offering political support and democratic legitimacy to projects 
who oppose the EU and due to their political posturing, are detrimental to local/
regional interests.
The mere appearance that the European project results in an asymmetry of  
opportunities that lead to the development and maintenance of  privileged and 
underprivileged groups within the EU, was previously cited by us as one of  the 
greatest challenges to its survival. This belief  strikes at the heart of  the economic 
construction and the very way the entire system was designed and implemented, 
putting into doubt the shared identity and solidarity which has been strived for. 
Indeed, this reality has long been considered as a structural element regarding 
interactions between Member States, we merely posit that the same interactions 
occur within them, at a sub-national level. Europe being host to a trove of  historical 
and cultural wealth also bears the wounds of  that development, with conflicts and 
rivalries seemingly forgotten but easily stoked to conflict. These very same conflicts 
do not end at the Member States’ borders but are invisibly traced along the face 
of  Europe within States. In this sense, as surely as the European Union is a peace 
project between nations, it is also for communities.
For these conflicts to not mortgage the development of  the greater European 
Project, there must be an expansion of  the very same principles that govern the 
interactions between Member States at a subnational level. Solidarity, Trust, 
Subsidiarity and Equality cannot be ignored within Member States as this only results 
in a form of  complete reverse discrimination in which marginalised areas, unable to 
seize the opportunities that are offered to them due to simple institutional frailty, are 
deprived of  the opportunity to create a more prosperous future and reap the benefits 
of  European integration.
48 Alex Marx et al., “Multilevel Protection of  the rule of  law and fundamental rights –the role of  local 
and regional authorities and of  the Committee of  the Regions”, Committee of  the Regions Study, 
2014, accessed June 18, 2021, doi: 10.2863/10131.
49 Paul Blokker, “The Constitutional Premises of  Subnational Self-Government in new democracies”, 36.
